At a security conference in Singapore over the weekend, the three AUKUS partners – the United States, United Kingdom and Australia – announced a tweak to their partnership that has generated quite a lot of attention in Canberra.
Australia will now receive three second-hand Virginia-class, nuclear-powered submarines in the coming years, instead of the original deal of two used vessels and one brand new sub.
Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles spun this as a welcome streamlining of the fleet that would simplify its supply chain, as well as the management and sustainment of these complex warships.
What Marles seems not to have noticed is that not all Virginia-class submarines are the same.
The new boat the US had promised would have been from Block 6, the most recent design. Instead, all of Australia’s submarines will now likely come from Block 4, which carry a much smaller weapon payload. Firepower is a measure of a fighting ship’s utility. Having the largest weapon capacity is a key ingredient for battle success.
It seems Australia has been a willing – not to say eager – victim of what is essentially a “bait and switch”.
The deal has always been unequal
The unilateral change of plans should not have come as a surprise to anyone in the Australian government.
AUKUS has always been a one-sided deal in which the US reaps the benefits while Australia accepts the risks. The agreement Australia entered into provides the US with numerous opportunities to cancel or modify the deal. Washington simply acted on what was permitted.
In addition, the AUKUS agreement allows the US president to cancel the submarine transfer at his or her whim, while Australia has no right to challenge or lobby against the decision. The current president, Donald Trump, is not known for loyalty to his allies. The fact the AUKUS deal was signed by his predecessor, Joe Biden, is likely to further reduce Trump’s level of commitment.
To make the US decision more of an affront, Australia has already contributed at least US$2 billion (A$2.8 billion) to the American submarine manufacturing pipeline.
The US is not building enough submarines to meet its own requirements, let alone the additional boats it has promised to Australia. The Australian cash contribution was meant to improve the US rate of production so Canberra would be able to get one or two of the latest boats. Australia’s investment has turned out to be a very poor one, and there are no refunds.
The Australian government has also misinterpreted what the US hopes to get out of the deal.
For the Americans, selling Australia any subs at all makes little sense in the contest with China for supremacy in the Western Pacific. It just reduces America’s own military capability.
The key element in AUKUS for the US has always been the submarine base that Australia is building at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. This is where the US Navy plans to operate its submarines. The US has already announced the establishment of the support elements that will administer and sustain these warships.
As we can see now, Australia has virtually no leverage to make the submarine deal more equitable.
The Americans know that Australian strategic policy since before the Vietnam War has been to demonstrate relevance to the US. Australia has not hesitated to rush into US-led wars – even those of dubious legality – in order to show loyalty. If this was a poker game, the Australians would be playing with most of their cards face-up.
What can Australia do to gain more agency?
Unfortunately, not a lot. The US holds all the important cards. Australia will likely continue to be a dutiful ally in the hope the US will deliver what it has promised. But there are no guarantees.
The only vulnerability the US has is its desire to base its submarines at Stirling. If Australia was to halt construction or restrict US access to the base, it would be seen as tantamount to cancelling the deal. The price Australia would pay for its temerity would be an enormous loss of respect and favour in Washington – the very thing a long succession of governments has sought to boost.
Australia’s defence policy has seen our country ensnared in a trap of its own making. There are lessons our political leaders can hopefully learn.
The first is to accept the wisdom of former UK Prime Minister Lord Palmerston’s adage that countries have no eternal allies, just eternal interests.
The second is to recognise that an unbalanced alliance leads to servility, not partnership.
The final lesson is to develop faith in Australia’s ability to protect itself rather than turning to an ally of increasingly dubious reliability.
Albert Palazzo is an Adjunct Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at UNSW Canberra, UNSW Sydney
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
