Taxable income is not the same as salary, private-practice income or net business profit. It doesn’t tell us how many hours people worked. But it does show that the group asking patients to absorb rising fees is not a low-income workforce.
Specialists should be well paid. The question is whether Medicare-subsidised specialist care should be allowed to become unaffordable for patients who need it.
A market where patients can’t really shop around
In a normal market, high prices attract new suppliers. More suppliers enter, competition increases, and prices stabilise or fall.
Specialist care does not work like that.
Increasing the number of practising specialists depends on many factors: training places, specialist college accreditation, supervision capacity in public hospitals, workforce planning, immigration rules and recognition of overseas-trained specialists. Expanding supply isn’t quick or easy.
Patients are not normal consumers either.
Someone who needs a colonoscopy, a cardiologist, a psychiatrist or a hip replacement is not in the same position as someone comparing petrol prices or ordering an Uber. Patients are usually unwell, worried or uncertain. They rely on a GP referral. They may not know what the appointment will cost, whether the referral can be redirected, how long the public wait is, or whether another specialist would be just as suitable.
There is also little room for trial and error. A bad meal teaches you not to go back to the restaurant. A badly timed or unaffordable medical decision can have far more serious consequences.
That is why leaving specialist care mainly to market forces, which is what policy decisions have done, produces predictable results.
A market shaped by ability to pay
Specialist fees vary a lot.
The out-of-pocket cost for a knee replacement in Australia can range from about $300 to more than $5,000. If petrol pricing worked like that, motorists would pay anywhere between $1.80 and $36 per litre, depending on which servo they used.
Fees also vary sharply between states and territories. The average specialist fee in the ACT is $605, compared with $144 in Tasmania. These figures include consultations as well as procedures and interventions, so they should not be read as the cost of a standard appointment. But the pattern is striking.
Fees are also strongly correlated with local personal income. In higher-income jurisdictions, specialists tend to charge more.
This doesn’t prove that individual specialists consciously price according to local incomes. But it is consistent with fees being shaped by local market power and capacity to pay, not just by the cost of providing care.
That is the predictable result of a publicly subsidised but weakly regulated private market.
Making the market more efficient
If Australia is going to have a health system in which people can see the right specialists when they need to, at a cost they can afford, the way the market is allowed to operate needs to change.
The Australia Institute’s submission to the parliamentary inquiry into specialist care proposes several practical reforms.
First, Medicare should be used to support fair and affordable fees. A national specialist fee and affordability framework could set benchmarks for reasonable fees, support no-gap and known-gap arrangements, and protect vulnerable patients from excessive out-of-pocket costs.
Second, patients and GPs need better information before a referral is locked in. Fee transparency is only the starting point. Patients also need information on likely out-of-pocket costs, public options, waiting times, telehealth availability and relevant quality and outcome indicators.
Third, governments need to plan specialist supply around need. That means looking at which specialties and regions are undersupplied, where public outpatient capacity is weakest, and how overseas-trained specialists can be used safely and effectively in recognised shortage areas.
Fourth, public specialist work needs to be made more attractive. Public hospitals need senior specialists to treat patients, supervise trainees, lead teams and sustain public capacity.
Finally, not every patient who needs specialist input needs a full specialist appointment. Better advice-and-guidance models could allow GPs to get timely specialist advice, helping some patients avoid unnecessary waits while ensuring full appointments are available for those who need them most.
None of this requires abolishing private practice or forcing every specialist to charge the same fee. It simply means recognising that specialist care is not an ordinary market. If public money helps fund specialist care, public rules should make sure that care is affordable, transparent and available according to need.
Is that not what Medicare is supposed to do?