Hundreds of diplomats from almost every country just met for four weeks at United Nations headquarters in New York to review the most comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the world. And they agreed to absolutely nothing.
After thousands of interventions, working papers, statements, national reports, side events, preparatory conferences, closed-door meetings and consultations, the delegates couldn’t even reach consensus on the most hollowed-out statement.
Nearly all of the 190 signatories genuflect to the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Yet, this is the third review conference in a row that has failed to achieve any agreed outcome. Since the treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995, only two conferences, in 2000 and 2010, reached any agreement at all.
The NPT contains a grand bargain: the five states that had nuclear weapons when the treaty was adopted in 1968 (China, France, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) would agree to disarm in exchange for countries without nuclear weapons pledging not to acquire them. These countries would instead gain access to technology and materials for “peaceful” nuclear uses.
While the International Atomic Energy Agency and its nuclear safeguards bind the states without nuclear weapons to their agreement, there is no organisation, process, timeline or enforcement on the disarmament side.
Nearly 60 years after the treaty entered into force, none of the disarmament measures that have been discussed repeatedly at NPT conferences over the decades have been implemented. Disarmament is going backwards. The world is in the midst of a new nuclear arms race with more dangerous, more accurate, faster, stealthier, and longer-range weapons being rolled out.
What the nuclear powers are doing
The five original nuclear-armed nations are to blame for the inability of the NPT to make any progress toward its stated goals.
At this latest conference in New York, they refused to even affirm past commitments to disarm, let alone commit to any new measures.
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said they used “aggressive diplomatic intimidation tactics against non-nuclear armed states” to prevent any agreement on a path forward.
The actions of the nuclear-armed states were even louder than their words over the past four weeks:
- both Russia and the US test-launched intercontinental nuclear missiles
- Russia invited Belarus to participate in nuclear weapons exercises for the first time
- Russia used a powerful, hypersonic missile that can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads to attack Kyiv
- and the US threatened to resume its unlawful attacks on Iran, risking radiation disasters at nuclear facilities across the Middle East.
This followed other steps toward proliferation. The US is also re-deploying nuclear weapons to the UK. And France is boosting its arsenal to extend its deterrence umbrella, including deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft, to cover eight European countries.
The UN’s disarmament chief, Izumi Nakamitsu, chastised the nuclear powers by saying:
It is simply wrong for them to assume that non-proliferation obligations will be upheld [by non-nuclear states] without their own commitment to – and implementation of – disarmament obligations.
What Australia can do
Smaller, non-nuclear states can make a difference, though, if they stand behind their commitments.
Australia, for one, voiced its disappointment in the failure of the conference to achieve any results. In a short statement, the government said it was “steadfast in its support of the NPT”.
But Australia can – and must – do better than issuing mildly worded statements, especially as it is contributing to escalating nuclear risks with its actions.
For example, the RAAF Base Tindal will soon host American nuclear-capable B-52 bombers. US submarines will also permanently rotate through Australian ports from 2027 as part of the AUKUS agreement. While not nuclear-armed now, those US submarines will be able to carry a new nuclear-tipped cruise missile by 2032. Australia maintains a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy of ambiguity on nuclear weapons, meaning the US doesn’t have to confirm or deny whether its military craft are actually carrying them.
And the joint US–Australia surveillance and communications bases at Pine Gap and North West Cape are also undergoing rapid expansions, which could assist the US in identifying targets if a nuclear war broke out.
Recently, the organisation I helped found, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Australia, issued a declaration signed by more than 160 Australian and Pacific Island organisations. It details what the Australian government could do to make the world safer from nuclear weapons.
First and foremost, the Labor government should follow through on its long-standing national policy promise to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This is a legally binding treaty that prohibits nuclear weapons and assisting in their use. It also provides the only internationally agreed framework for eliminating nuclear weapons.
The Albanese government must also hold firm on keeping nuclear weapons out of Australia, as Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser did in relation to B-52s during the Cold War.
This means ending Australia’s reliance on US nuclear weapons in our military policies, and ensuring there are no US nuclear weapons based at Australian facilities or Australian personnel contributing to their possible use.
We also need to pursue an alternative to acquiring submarines fuelled by weapons-grade, highly-enriched uranium under the AUKUS agreement.
Dr Tilman Ruff AO is an Honorary Principal Fellow at the School of Population and Global Health at The University of Melbourne.
Since 2012, Dr Tilman Ruff AO has been a co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW, Nobel Peace Laureate 1985). He is a co-founder and was founding international and Australian chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN, Nobel Peace Laureate 2017), and serves on the Committee of ICAN Australia.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
